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This paper reviews the important factors affecting the current status of debt
finance and debt management by the City of Boston, including the City's
significant credit problems and the financing implications. While significant
challenges to Boston's finance and debt management have recently been met in
part through a combination of fiscal austerity measures and altered operating and
financing approaches, there are important new debt financing challenges facing
Boston in 1984 and beyond.
Among the more important financing and debt management issues facing the
City include the City's need to finance cash flow shortfalls, the City's restricted
access to capital sources, the perceptions of the credit rating agencies and other
major financial institutions toward Boston's securities, and the appropriate
allocation of discretionary funds for capital construction projects in the City.
The debt finance and debt management issues facing Boston in 1984 are
substantial. Taken in context, however, they suggest that the City's 1984 debt and
credit policies should be directed toward meeting the immediate financial needs
while at least protecting, if not enhancing, the City's current credit position. The
City faces a thin cash flow early in 1984 and has to retire $25 million of bond
anticipation notes on June 29, 1984. As a result, the City faces an immediate need
to issue long-term, limited tax bonds in Spring 1984 in order to avoid a potential
serious cash flow shortfall.
The City also has an ongoing need to access the short-term market to keep
itself solvent. First, the City routinely experiences a thin cash flow balance at
various points during its fiscal year. Second, the majority of property taxes, which
represent the principal source of revenues, is received in November and May of
each year. Hence, the City will have to issue short-term debt annually in an
amount of approximately $65 million in most years. Thus, the City's ability to
convince investors to purchase short-term debt to finance these shortfalls will
depend on the maintenance and enhancement of the City's basic credit worthiness.
As history demonstrates, cash flow shortfalls result in political and financial
crises with effects that linger well beyond the year of the shortfall. In issuing
long-term debt late in fiscal 1984, the City could sell as much as $45-50 million in
long-term, general obligation bonds. If the City sold securities in this amount,
approximately half of the bond proceeds could be applied to the payment of the
bond anticipation notes, with the other half of "new" funds being available to fund
capital projects in fiscal 1985. There are numerous capital and rehabilitation
purposes that could be financed by these "new" monies, though some of which may
be restricted by court-mandated expenditures.
While the $45-50 million debt issue would meet the immediate financial needs,
special emphasis must be given to enhancing Boston's credit position in 1984 and
beyond. There are four major factors that have been identified by credit analysts
in the financial community as negatively impacting the City's credit position. The
first is the large degree of fixed costs: the City's expenses for education, health
and hospitals, debt service, mass transit and pension are financed directly from the
City's operating budget. These expenses put substantial pressure on Boston's
limited revenue sources and as a result, cause concerns about Boston's ability to
access sufficient revenues to pay all of its obligations.
The second factor that negatively impacts Boston's credit standing is the
inability of the City to translate its economic resources into a revenue source. The
City's ineffectiveness is largely due to the restrictions imposed on its ability to
impose and raise taxes. As a result, the City's revenue sources are largely
unresponsive to any economic upsurge occurring in Boston. One strategy to turn
some of the economic activity into revenues for the City may be to continue to
access state aid which is made available through annual appropriations by the
Commonwealth, since state revenues are more sensitive to economic activity.
However, this source is indirect and is subject to annual appropriation; expansion of
revenues that are more under the control of the City itself would be met more
favorably by the credit markets.
The third factor limiting Boston's credit position is the City's inflexible revenue
sources, especially its dependency on property taxes, which are now subject to
special budgetary limitation. Boston's tax structure is highly restricted and, as a
result, will continue to hinder the City's credit worthiness.
The fourth negative factor is the disproportionate assessment refunds that have
been and will continue to be paid by the City. The financial strain imposed by
these claims served to further weaken Boston's financial situation. Monies the City
committed to pay these refunds were not available for other potential City uses.
However, it appears that the payment for the majority of these liabilities has been
established, and the credit problem imposed by these liabilities has been lessened in
fiscal 1984. Until all of the Tregor and related obligations have been retired, the
specter of the remaining payments for these liabilities will remain a credit concern
to the investment community.
Other factors, including among others, the outcome of the City's labor
negotiations, the need to alter the City's debt repayment schedule, etc., will also
impact the perception of Boston's securities and its ability to attract the necessary
investors for the City's bond and note financings. The City will have to actively
pursue those policies and procedures that will strengthen the City's credit in the
eyes of credit analysts and potential investors in order to ensure that the City
maintains the sound debt finance and debt management necessary to keep the City
financially and politically viable.
Statement of Issue
This paper reviews the important factors affecting the
current status of debt finance and debt management by the City
of Boston/ including the City's significant credit problems
and the financing implications. While significant challenges
to Boston's finance and debt management have recently been met
in part through a combination of fiscal austerity measures and
altered operating and financing approaches, there are important
new debt financing challenges facing Boston in 1984 and beyond.
Among the more important financing and debt management
issues facing the City include the City's need to finance cash
flow shortfalls, the City's restricted access to capital sources,
the perceptions of the credit rating agencies and other major
financial institutions toward Boston's securities, and the
appropriate allocation of discretionary funds for capital
construction projects in the City.
II . Key "Problem" Areas
Several of the major debt finance and debt management
problems facing the City are discussed below:
A. Cash Flow Requirements
Absence of cash for a government leads to institutional,
financial and political impotence. For Boston, the major City
revenues (e.g., property taxes) are due in November and May of
each year, while monthly expenditures tend to remain fairly
constant throughout the year (although there are certain excep-
tions). As a result, the City typically needs . to issue tax
anticipation notes annually in the amount of approximately $65
million in anticipation of receipt of property taxes. In this
respect, the City's financial lifeline remains its ability to
sell short-term debt to cover the inevitable shortfalls before
property taxes are received. In general, the City should sell
sufficient short-term debt at the beginning of the fiscal year,
i.e., August-September, in an amount that will provide a cushion
large enough to cover potential shortfalls during the entire
year
.
However, the reason that only $25 million in tax anticipa-
tion notes has been sold thus far by the City for fiscal 1984
was a result of the fact that tax bills were expected to be
sent in October, 1984 so that sufficient monies would be
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received by the City from the collection of property taxes in
November. Because of the large cash influx in early fiscal
1984 from the delay of collections in fiscal 1983, the City
found it difficult to justify even a modest $25 million
borrowing, because of the sizeable amount of cash from
property tax receipts on hand in early 1984, and to comply
with regulations of the Internal Revenue Service regarding the
amount of tax-exempt debt that can be issued by a governmental
entity in anticipation of taxes.
It should be noted that the City at present has approxi-
mately $40 million of additional tax anticipation notes that
can be sold with the same security provisions as the outstanding
$25 million during fiscal 1984. Access to borrowed funds to
meet the cash shortfalls will be necessary for the City
government to remain financially solvent and institutionally
sound.
B . Issuance of Long-Term Bonds
The City must sell long-term, general obligation bonds in
sufficient time to have funds on hand to repay $25 million of
bond anticipation notes that mature on June 29, 1984. It should
also be emphasized that if the City is unable to sell long-
term bonds to repay the $25 million, the City would have to
repay the $25 million of bond anticipation notes from its own
funds; with the City continuing to face budgetary pressures,
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it would not appear that the City will have sufficient monies
on hand to retire the $25 million without further cut-backs in
operations
.
Based on the recent performance of Boston securities in
the long-term bond market/ it would appear that the City could
sell as much as $45-50 million in long-term, general obligation
bonds in the spring, 1984. If the City sells $45-50 million,
approximately half of the bond proceeds would have to be applied
to the payment of bond anticipation notes, which have been
sold for projects already identified and approved. However,
there would be sufficient incremental monies in the bond sale
in the range of $20-25 million representing funds to establish
capital priorities and initiatives. The incremental amount of
proceeds raised through the bond issue would be available to
fund capital projects through the early half of fiscal 1985,
until a subsequent issue of bonds or bond anticipation notes
has been sold.
There are numerous options with respect to the use of
this incremental "new" amount. For example, because of the
small amount of capital expenditures that have been made by
the City over the last three years, which will be discussed
later in this paper, a meaningful funding of capital rehabili-
tation remains unaccomplished.
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It should be emphasized, however, that flexibility in the
use of bond proceeds may be limited because of certain court-
mandated capital expenditures, mainly the prospective funding
of the Charles Street jail. While all the proceeds not used
for the repayment of bond anticipation notes would probably
not have to be assigned to the court-mandated purpose, if the
City is required to participate in this jail financing, a
portion of the potential "new" money would be exhausted for
this purpose.
Because of recent changes in the City's credit ratings
and other adjustments in the City's credit and financial
picture, it would appear possible for the City to possibly
sell long-term debt in April at nearly twice the level that
the City has funded at any time over the previous three-year
period. Thus, new programmatic options do exist for determin-
ing the application of new bond money.
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C. City's Credit Position
The City's access to borrowed funds for meeting its
financing requirements discussed above depends on whether the
City can demonstrate its ability to repay its incurred debt.
The City has been an acceptable institutional name for purchase
by some financial institutions, notwithstanding the rating
problems that have plagued the City's debt issues. However,
this capital has been narrow for the most part over the last
several years, limited to a small number of institutional
sources of funds.
It is important to stress the fact that the City's
ability to finance the requirements discussed above will
continue to depend, in large part, on the City's credit
ratings, as established by Moody's Investors Service and
Standard & Poor's Corporation, the two nationally recognized
credit rating agencies. A government's credit rating affects
whether its securities qualify as eligible investments for
financial institutions (e.g., commercial banks, insurance
companies, etc.). In general, if a rating falls within the
top four rating classifications, then the security meets the
basic credit criteria of these institutions for regulatory
approval purposes
.
Frequently, questions are asked about the "real"
importance of the rating agencies. Obviously, a citizen will
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assume that the higher the rating, the better managed are the
City resources, but this assumption is only partially true.
However, there are significant financial effects of the rating
agencies. For example, as a rule of thumb, a distinction from
one rating category to the next represents approximately one
half of one percent in interest costs on a long-term bond issue.
Thus, the difference between a AAA rated municipality and a
Ba-1 rated municipality may be as much as 2-1/2 percentage
points for a bond issue. Assuming a $30 million issue with
comparable repayment schedules, the Ba-1 governmental entity
may pay as much as $7.5 million more in interest costs over
the life of the securities.
The City's credit ratings assigned by the national credit
rating agencies have limited the appeal of the City's securities.
In general, the City's credit ratings resemble those of most
cities in the Northeast. By one rating agency, the City is
rated slightly above most other cities in the region, while
the other agency rates Boston on the same level, or slightly
below other Northeastern cities. First of all, Boston has
experienced a decline in ratings simply because of its location
and the rating agencies' perspective that the credit for North-
eastern cities has generally experienced a generic deterioration,
primarily, with respect to their economies. The agencies cite
a decrease in relative wealth levels, stagnation in property
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values, greater dependency on intergovernmental revenues and
similar items for many of these cities. These characteristics
are often found in credit reports on sizeable Northeastern
cities, including New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Boston, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Camden, etc.
However, both agencies have also noted four other special
negative factors in quantifying Boston's credit position.
First, they identify the large fixed costs that the City must
pay (e.g., pension payments, debt service, MBTA payments and
transfers to such entities as the Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion). Second, they indicate that the City's economic growth
has not been translated directly into revenue sources for use
by the City to meet ongoing City expenditures. Third, they
frequently cite that the City has virtually no revenue flexi-
bility in light of its high dependency on property taxes,
particularly taking into consideration the restrictions of
Proposition 2-1/2. Fourth, the agencies consider that the
budgetary effects of the City's disproportionate assessment
liabilities and the passage of Proposition 2-1/2 have further
undermined the stability of the City's financial standing.
Unfortunately, most of these matters can not be resolved over-
night. These represent structural problems, which need a long-
term financial strategy.
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It should be noted that over the recent past, the credit
rating agencies have become convinced that the economy of Boston
may be substantially different from many of the static economies
of other cities in the Northeast. Nevertheless, without the
ability to translate economic resources into substantive revenue
sources to meet recurring operating and other obligations,
Boston has not yet received a major favorable adjustment in
its rating from the agencies.
As evidence of the rating community's misgivings about
one aspect of the City's credit (e.g., the revenue structure
of Massachusetts municipalities), Standard & Poor's Corporation
lowered the City's credit rating one level in December, 1980,
one month following the passage of Proposition 2-1/2, and
Moody's Investors Service withdrew in March of 1981, four
months after the passage of Proposition 2-1/2, the ratings for
forty-four local governments, citing, as a principal reason,
the uncertainty surrounding the legislative prospects for ade-
quately addressing the key fiscal and debt management problems
created by Proposition 2-1/2. At the time, Moody's indicated
that by late June of that year, it would begin the process of
reinstatement of ratings, although not necessarily at the
previous levels. True to its word, Moody's began this process
over the summer, and, at the completion of the process, 75% of
the Massachusetts localities had been downgraded, and the
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remaining localities were assigned to their previous classifi-
cations. Boston was one of the Massachusetts municipalities
which had its rating reduced one level - this time, to Ba, a
non-investment grade category.
For the most recent, general obligation bond issue that
was sold by the City for capital construction purposes, both
rating agencies were inclined to rate the post Proposition 2-
1/2 debt on the same basis as the pre-2-1/2 debt at Ba-1 for
Moody's and BBB+ by Standard & Poor's Corporation, notwith-
standing the fact that the general obligation debt sold sub-
sequent to the passage of 2-1/2 was supported by limited taxing
authority, while the debt sold prior to the passage was supported
by the City's unlimited taxing powers. After considerable
discussions with the agencies, it was concluded by the agencies
that a pragmatic approach toward the City's rating for new
debt was appropriate, since it would take an extraordinarily
distressful condition to occur financially for the technical
differentiation regarding debt service on the limited and on
the unlimited debt obligations to be operative. This approach
by the agencies does offer some greater flexibility than would
appear on the surface - that is, investors holding debt obliga-
tions secured by the City's unlimited taxing pledge would not
experience deterioration in credit quality by purchasing new
debt obligations.
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In order for Boston to have improved access to large
pools of investable funds, the City's credit must be perceived
favorably by the rating agencies.
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Ill . Background/History/Contextual Factors
To gain some further insight into the current credit
problems facing Boston, it is important to examine the context
of various matters affecting the City's current credit picture.
These factors are frequently cited by underwriters, investors
and rating agencies as credit features impacting their view of
Boston securities.
A. Level of Public Service
One important issue is the degree of financial responsi-
bility that Boston has for public services. Boston raises and
spends almost twice as much per capita as do comparable cities
across the nation. This occurrence is largely accounted for
by the fact that other forms of government (e.g., counties,
special districts, and school districts) are much more active
in raising and spending funds across the nation than they are
in New England. The two major examples of this are illustrated
by the fact that Boston, not a school district, directly finances
the City's public school system and Boston again, not another
government entity, has major health and hospital financing
responsibilities.
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B. Heavy Reliance on Property Taxes
A second major issue is the heavy reliance of Boston on
property taxes, which has been virtually unsurpassed by major
American cities. However, as a result of Proposition 2-1/2,
in 1982, the City had to reduce its property tax $78 million
from the 1981 level of $518.7; in 1983 and 1984, the City's
tax levy was reduced by 15% and 12.6%, respectively.
As a result, Boston has had more demands on its revenue
raising powers than most other cities of comparable size and
structure around the nation. Cities in most other states are
also able to rely on general or selective sales taxes as an
additional source of revenue.
C . Disproportionate Assessment Refunds
Another factor that negatively impacted the City's
finances resulted from the 1979 decision in the case of Tregor
v. Assessors of Boston . As a result of this decision and related
ones, the City had to refund certain taxes that it had collected
from commercial property holders. These liabilities, which
will ultimately require a cash outlay in excess of $100 million,
has put extreme pressure on Boston's credit position and financial
flexibility. To address the fund problem poised by the City's
disproportionate assessment liabilities and related credit and
financial problems, the Funding Act of 1982 was passed. The
-13-
Act authorized the issuance of $45 million in Funding Loan
Bonds and provided for the sale of the Hynes Auditorium in
/
fiscal year 1983. The Act also established an excise tax on
hotels and motels in the City/ an excise tax on the recording
of deeds, instruments and writings filed with Suffolk County,
an excise on condominiums and real estate consolidation, and
authorized the City to charge an "augmented fire services
availability" fee for certain structures which place special
burdens on the City's fire protection services. This latter
fee has been enjoined by the Supreme Court on the grounds that
it was not proportionately assessed.
D. Control over Department Revenues
Over the years, one additional financial problem which
has been identified as a significant credit factor was the
City's limited degree of financial control over its depart-
ments. Certain provisions of the 1982 Funding Loan Act make
City departments, notably the School Department, subject to
expenditure control through a system of quarterly spending
allotment. These allotments are to enable the City Auditor to
keep track of the rate of departmental spending and give the
Mayor the power to decide to waive enforcement of the allotment
limit depending on circumstances. The Act also establishes
certain mechanisms that limit the flexibility of financial
administration, in particular, the ability to transfer
appropriations between departments. While some concern still
exists among various sectors of the financial community regard-
ing the financial control over City departments , this new
structure has assisted in enhancing the City's credibility in
the credit markets for the City's financial operations.
E. Debt Structure
Certain other historical factors that impact on the debt
finance and debt management operations of the City fall into a
category which can be classified as "debt structure".
Among the more important items in debt structure is the
absolute level of debt burden. During most of the recent past,
Boston's debt load, as calculated by the rating agencies, was
among the highest of cities throughout the country. In general,
debt burden reflects tax-supported indebtedness related to
available taxable resources (i.e., full taxable value of
property located within the City). Until the completion of
the revaluation in fiscal 1983, the rating agencies relied on
either equalized value or a highly conservative estimate of
the City's full taxable value (e.g., $5-6 billion). However,
with the taxable value established through revaluation at
$12.2 billion, the calculated debt load was reduced by
approximately 50%. In fact, the City's debt burden now
approximates the median for cities of populations of 500,000
and above
.
The second important debt structure issue involves the
City's maturity schedule and the rapidity of its debt retire-
ment. The rating agencies use a rule of thumb that indicates
that the repayment of debt should approximate 50% of total
outstanding debt within ten years and 25% within five years.
The City's bonds currently mature in an amount of approximately
41% in five years and in excess of 81% in ten years. While
the City recaptures debt capacity in a relatively short period
of time as a result of this rapid rate of principal repayment,
the maturity schedules place significant pressure on the City's
operating budget to meet these scheduled payments. In the
face of the significant budgetary pressures that the City
already faces, this additional pressure reduces the financial
flexibility to manage its services and operations effectively.
F. Unfunded Pension Liability
The City provides pension benefits through a contributory
retirement system, the State-Boston Retirement System ("S-BRS" ).
The City meets its share of the contributory cost on a pay-as-
you-go basis by contributing annually to the fund. The City's
annual contribution is a legal obligation that must be included
in the tax levy.
The net appropriated contribution of the City to the S-
BRS was $75.5 million in 1982 and $75.8 million in 1983.
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According to some estimates, the City has a total
actuarial pension liability of $1.79 billion as of June 30,
1982. The market value of accumulated assets of the S-BRS
reserved for funding purposes was estimated to amount to
$293.5 million at June 30, 1983; hence, the total unfunded
liability was approximately $1.56 billion.
The City estimates that the net unfunded actuarial
liability of S-BRS actually aggregates approximately $1.2
billion. Due to the City's limited financial resources, the
City is not funding either the $1.2 billion unfunded liability,
nor the accruing, but not payable liabilities out of its current
operating revenus. Only the pensions associated with the City's
Department of Health and Hospitals is funded from current
revenues
.
A rising expenditure for a fixed cost item, such as
pensions, without a concomitant revenue increase, creates,
over the near future, less flexibility for the City to meet
other financial obligations.
G . Other Items That Impact Current Operations
There are several other factors that have frequently been
raised by rating agencies, underwriters and institutional in-
vestors, as causing concern regarding the impact of these
matters on the City's prospective financial operations.
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1 . State Aid
State aid by the Commonwealth to Massachusetts munici-
palities has increased in recent years. The City received
$269.6 million for general fund purposes in fiscal 1983 which
represented an increase of $42.4 million from fiscal 1982.
The City expects to receive approximately $302.7 million in
fiscal 1984, an increase of 12.3% over 1983's figure. On a
percent basis, State aid composed 31% of the City's revenues
in fiscal 1983 and is estimated to compose 32% in fiscal 1984.
This increase in State aid has helped to offset the effects of
Proposition 2-1/2.
The importance of State aid to the City has grown since
the passage of Proposition 2-1/2. Since the Proposition limits
the property tax levy in any city or town to 2-1/2 percent of
the value, once the limit is reached, no new levy in a future
fiscal year can exceed, without voter approval, the previous
levy by more than 2-1/2 percent.
The continuation of a sizeable level of State aid will
affect the response of the investment community to the City's
credit. However, even with the increase of State aid, municipal
bond analysts frequently cite the fact that the City's receipt
of State aid is dependent on the State's annual appropriation
process, which makes these funds less certain than monies
directly under control of the City. Second, they also fre-
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quently stress that State aid is a highly indirect way of the
City receiving the financial benefits of the economic activity
that occurs within the City of Boston.
2 . Federal Aid
Boston's financial picture has benefited extensively from
the Federal programs for urban renewal and employment and train-
ing. However, in recent years, direct Federal aid to Boston
and other large cities has declined. In fiscal years 1981 and
1982, the City received $133.5 million and $98.9 million
respectively in Federal revenues. Further, the City's Federal
aid receipts declined to approximately $71.6 million in fiscal
year 1983. Part of this decline is related to the general
decline in funding for Federal programs and partially reflects
changes in the City's demographics resulting in lower funds
for the City.
A decrease in Federal aid payments combined with the
other budgetary pressures for the City is cited by municipal
analysts as causing further operating and financial cutbacks.
3 . Non-Recurring Revenues
As part of the 1982 Funding Loan Act, the City was
authorized to issue $45 million in bonds and to sell the Hynes
Auditorium to the State and to dispose of other surplus proper-
ties. Funds from these non-recurring sources were to be used
primarily for the retirement of the remaining Tregor liabil-
-19-
ities/ but any excess funds were credited to the City's
General Fund. A portion of the $45 million bond issue and the
monies available from the sale of Hynes and four municipal
parking garages will be available on a net basis for fiscal
1984 general revenues. These additional revenues are expected
to improve the overall liquidity of the City's finances in
fiscal 1984 since they will help offset fiscal 1983 's operat-
ing deficit. However/ these monies will not be available for
meeting the City's fiscal 1985 financial obligations, which
will create a sizeable budgetary gap, requiring either addi-
tional expenditure reductions or extensive revenue enhance-
ments .
4. Labor Union Contracts
The largest component of the City's financial obligations
consists of personnel costs. At present, the future financial
responsibilities of the City for meeting these costs are unknown,
since labor contracts have yet to be settled with the terms
for large retroactive payments and prospective salary levels
still being negotiated. It appears that these unresolved labor
payments and contracts will not be dealt with in until the next
administration takes office. The size and terms of the
settlements will have a major effect on the City's future
finances, and this fact has been emphasized recently by many
participants in the credit markets.
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5 . Other Fixed Costs
a . Health and Hospitals
The City of Boston provides extensive health services
including, but not limited to, the operation of neighborhood
outpatient health clinics, and several hospitals, including
Boston City Hospital. These services are funded by a combina-
tion of revenue generated through fees for health services and
transfers from the City's General Fund. In 1982, this transfer
from the General Fund amounted to $19 million. On October 1,
1982, a new third-party reimbursement system for the City's
acute care facilities was established. As a result of this
new system, revenues from the operation of the City's Health
and Hospitals department were estimated to total $110 million
in fiscal 1984 in comparison to approximately $94.5 million in
fiscal 1983. Even though the revenues have increased in fiscal
1984, the City anticipates that the cost of providing medical
services will continue to exceed revenues generated from the
new system since the reimbursement system does not cover all
the patients the City serves. In fiscal 1983, the operating
transfer is expected to increase due, in part, to $8 million
of Medicaid overpayments to the City in fiscal 1982. Addition-
ally, the transfer to the department is likely to increase in
fiscal 1983 and beyond since the new reimbursement system is
based on a set and regulated charge rate. Hence, cost reim-
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bursements to the City may lag behind costs as the charges
have to be approved by the Commonwealth's Rate Setting
Commission.
b. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
( "MBTA"
)
The MBTA provides rapid transit and other mass
transportation services to Boston and 78 other outlying
cities. The MBTA has and is expected to continue to run an
operating deficit (the excess of current expenses, including
debt service, over current revenues). To meet these consistent
operating deficits, the MBTA has had three revenue sources:
(1) state general fund payments, (2) federal operating assist-
ance under the Urban Mass Transportation Act Section 5 (which
have been greatly reduced in recent years, and (3) assessments
on cities served by the MBTA. Boston's assessment has usually
amounted to approximately 42% of the total annual assessment.
The Commonwealth has increased its annual appropria-
tions to the MBTA which, in turn, directly reduces the net
cost of the MBTA's service deficit assessed to the served
cities. In fiscal 1982, the MBTA deficit was approximately
$251 million. Of that amount, the Commonwealth's share was
approximately $140 million, and the City's share was nearly
$41 million. The balance of the deficit was covered by Federal
Operating assistance and assessments on other cities. It should
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be emphasized that the annual growth of the local assessments
on all the cities served by MBTA is limited to 2-1/2 percent
of the prior year's assessment. Hence/ the amount assessed on
the City of Boston is limited to increases of 2-1/2 percent
per year, no matter the size of the MBTA ' s deficit.
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IV. Primary Decision Considerations and Strategies
A. Bonds For Financing New Capital Construction
Since the $25 million bond anticipation note must be
retired on June 29, 1984, it is strategic to use that oppor-
tunity to achieve a number of ends. If a bond sale of between
$45-$50 million is achievable in Spring 1984, approximately
half of the bond proceeds could be applied to the retirement
of the $25 million bond anticipation notes, with the other
half being used to fund a program of capital projects. The
incremental amount of proceeds raised through the bond issue
would be available to fund capital projects through much of
fiscal 1985, until subsequent bonds or bond anticipation notes
are sold.
For the fiscal years 1978 through 1980, capital expend-
itures ranged between $45 million and $65 million which were
funded out of long-term debt. Proposition 2-1/2 and the
uncertainties surrounding the City's liabilities for the dis-
proportionate assessment refunds severely reduced the City's
ability to issue long-term debt and hence resulted in sub-
stantially reduced capital expenditures during the fiscal
years 1981-1983. Indeed, capital expenditures amounted to
approximately $24.7 million in fiscal 1981, $7.6 million in
fiscal 1982 and an estimated $20 million in fiscal 1983.
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Needless to say, there are a large number of unfunded capital
infrastructure needs as a result of this significantly reduced
level of funding. As stated above, the City's flexibility in
choosing between capital projects may be limited as a result
of certain court-mandated capital expenditures, including
approximately ?7 million to complete the first phase of the
rehabilitation work on the Charles Street Jail, and an estimated
$3 million to renovate two City high schools. While the $45-
50 million bond issued in April, 1984 will provide the City
with funds for capital projects, some of these funds may be
seriously restricted.
While numerous studies have concluded that Boston's
physical plant is in need of substantial capital expenditures,
the largest capital expenditures planned for Boston are for
mass transit, highways and bridges, and water and sewer improve-
ments. The funding for these infrastructure projects is not
the responsibility of the City itself. Mass transit needs are
provided by the MBTA which is funded principally from the
Federal and State governments and from assessments on cities
it serves.
Similiarly, the City's highways and bridges needs are the
responsibility of the State, the Metropolitan District Commis-
sion or the Federal Government. In fact, Boston has financed
no major street improvements without Federal or State assistance,
and virtually all of the capital repairs or replacement of
Boston's bridges are carried out with State and Federal funds.
While Boston water and sewer physical demands are quite
large as evidenced by the fact that more than twenty percent
of the City's water distribution system was built before 1900
and that seventy percent of Boston's sewers were laid before
1910/ the City finances none of the capital needs in this area.
The State created the Boston Water and Sewer Commission in
1978 and authorized it to sell revenue bonds backed by water
fees and charges to finance all water and sewer capital expend-
itures in the City. Hence, while Boston has numerous capital
needs, the most immediate of these are not the responsibility
of the City. There are a number of categories of capital
requirements that are the City's responsibility (e.g., parks.
City-owned and maintained roadways, and parks). Yet the
opportunity exists for using borrowed monies beyond these
responsibilities
.
As a result of the increased amount of City bonds that
can now apparently be sold, a key public policy issue will be
the purposes for which future borrowed capital construction
funds will be employed.
B . Debt Repayment Schedule
Legislation is now pending in the Commonwealth which would
improve the City's debt management operations in many respects.
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Among the important issues that this legislation addresses is
the authorization for the City of Boston to extend the period
over which debt may be repaid. It would be good public policy
for the City to have the capacity to reduce the amount of current
operating funds that must be employed to repay principal annually.
This approach does not suggest that a substantial shift should
occur/ but it does recommend a more conventional approach be
adopted, approximating the rating agencies' rule of thumb of
25% of principal being repaid in five years and 50% in ten
years. Not only would this occurrence improve the operating
burden of the City in terms of reducing fixed costs, but it
would also improve the credit standing of the City among insti-
tutions and in the investment community which should result in
lower capital financing costs for the City.
C. Cash Flow Integrity
Access to borrowed funds for meeting cash flow require-
ments relies on the integrity of the City's cash flow operations.
Therefore, it will be important for the City to show significant
restraint in expenditures so that the City can demonstrate
adequate coverage of principal and interest on the notes to be
issued in anticipation of tax receipts. Without this demonstra-
tion of fiscal integrity, the City will be restricted in its
ability to achieve financing for cash flow purposes. In this
case, without access to funds for meeting these purposes, the
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political and institutional authority of the City will be
jeopardized; in addition, the roles of other units of govern-
ment and other groups, including the financial community and
large recipients of City funds (e.g., City employees), will
then become much more important, conceivably restricting the
capacities and the authority of the elected leadership.
D. Use of Revenue Bond Financing
There were a series of reasons for the creation of the
Boston Water and Sewer Commission, some of which relate to
good debt management. For example, over the recent past,
because of a number of problems that issuers of general
obligation debt had experienced (e.g., New York City and
Cleveland), in which defaults occurred and for other related
reasons, including the use of more specific contractual provi-
sions, the appeal of revenue bonds substantially grew. Moreover,
in many circumstances, the rating agencies will apply a signi-
ficantly higher rating on revenue bond securities than they
will on general obligation debt, particularly in those circum-
stances in which the underlying general obligation issuer has
important visible credit problems.
It should be emphasized the higher the rating, the lower
the debt financing cost will be to the citizens. In this respect,
the Water and Sewer Commission has proven to be a less expensive
way of financing water and sewer capital expenditures than
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they would have been through the City itself. For example, at
present/ the Water and Sewer Commission is rated Baa-1 by Moody's
and A by Standard & Poor's, both of which are meaningfully
higher than the rating on the City's general obligation debt.
Thus/ capital financing costs through the Boston Water and
Sewer Commission are below those for City general obligation
debt
.
It would be important/ therefore, for the City to consider
ways in which to finance capital construction expenditures,
wherever possible, on a revenue bond basis. In those cases
where it will appear that a revenue structure is appropriate
in which fees and charges rather than general taxes would be
employed to repay indebtedness, and appropriate contractual
arrangements can be established for this purpose, the City
should pursue this revenue bond approach.
Another good example of the use of revenue bond financing
for capital requirements involves a project in which the City
is now engaged. The City is currently preparing the package
for financing of a resource recovery project to eliminate solid
waste refuse from the City. The cost of landfill and the lack
of availability of appropriate landfill sites have limited the
use of this approach for removing solid waste. The major
features of the resource recovery project involve the City
paying a tipping fee to a joint venture company, composed of
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Browning-Ferris and Air Projects, which will in turn process
waste material and generate steam which Boston Edison has
agreed to purchase. At present, based on the current schedule
of activities, it is expected that the Industrial Development
Finance Authority of Boston will sell tax-exempt, revenue debt
for this project during the summer of 1984. The intent of
this program is to provide solid waste disposal at attractive
operating and capital costs to the City.
The more extensive use of revenue bonds can be more
attractive financially to the City, at least as long as the
current credit ratings of the City remain in place.
E. Alternative Funding Options
The market into which the City of Boston sells its securi-
ties has changed significantly in recent years. During much
of the seventies, most of the debt sold by governmental entities
was general obligation debt, secured by the entities' general
taxing powers. Recently, a major shift has occurred, with
most tax-exempt debt now being sold as revenue bonds, secured
by particular fees and charges. In addition, institutions had
utilized the tax-exempt interest feature of governmental secur-
ities to a greater extent than they presently do; reliance by
the institutions on other tax advantages (e.g., leasing, foreign
tax credits, etc.) has reduced the attractiveness of tax-exempt
securities. As a result, the pool of institutional investable
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funds has decreased/ and the interest rate differential
between taxable and tax-exempt rates has also narrowed.
Alternative approaches to financing governmental capital
requirements have grown in response to the changing composition
of the market. In fact, the use of greater private sector
participation through service contracts and other direct
assistance has expanded. The substitution of private credit
for public credit through back-up bank guarantees, insurance,
etc., has become more prevalent. Also, various forms of leas-
ing arrangements have become popular, such as sale/leaseback
and lease/purchase programs.
A new approach toward the financing of Boston equipment
and vehicles has recently been implemented. For the current
1984 fiscal year, the City has negotiated an agreement with
Gelco of Minnesota to finance all of the City's lease-purchase
items for the entire fiscal year. Boston is one of the few
cities in the country to have a master lease program. Most
lease-purchase-type financings are done on an individual basis
(i.e., financing of computers, vehicles, wordprocessor s , etc.,
separately) ; this approach frequently produces duplicative and
costly administrative charges since new documents and arrange-
ments are used and applied for each lease. However, with a
master lease program, one document is prepared for one source
of funding which finances all of the lease-purchase items for
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the entire year. In addition, certain additional investment
income can occasionally be achieved when all of the money can
be drawn down at once at the beginning of the fiscal year and
invested at taxable rates. The City then receives the differ-
ential investment income between its tax-exempt rate and the
taxable rate until monies are actually needed to buy the
individual items. It will be important for the City to seek
out opportunities for alternative, cost-effective financing
vehicles, in order to adapt to the changing and frequently
less attractive bond and note markets.
F. Internal Implementation of Capital Construction
Program
In the 1960s and late 1970s, the City of Boston had an
active capital improvement program and accessed the long-term
market on a routine basis to fund capital projects. However,
events in recent years have prevented the City from entering
the long-term market and as a result, the City's capital im-
provement program was significantly reduced. As stated
previously, the emphasis of City financial and debt management
shifted principally to the short-term market for meeting the
City's operating requirements. The City enhanced its planning
and execution ability in the operations of the short-term market.
Since increased capital expenditures are projected again for
fiscal 1984, the City will need to concentrate on the internal
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organizational capacity to plan and implement a successful
capital construction program.
G. Participation of State Aid
The inability of the City to raise the tax levy in future
fiscal years greatly limits the City's ability to utilize its
developing business economy. The primary way the City will be
able to take advantage of its economic development for increased
revenues is through an indirect means of taxation. One such
indirect means is through the Commonwealth's appropriated funds.
The Commonwealth's revenue structure is much more sensitive
and responsive to economic growth than the City's. As a result,
the City's financial strength is vitally linked to State aid,
not only to compensate for the reductions in property tax levies,
but also to enable the City to generate revenues from the surge
of economic activity in the City. Taking into account the
sizeable reduction in recent Federal aid payments to Boston,
it will continue to be very important for the City to pursue a
strategy which will annually result in adequate State funds
being available as a recurring City revenue source.
H. Other Improvements to the City's Credit Condition
A variety of approaches can be employed to improve the
City's credit position. Most of these approaches require the
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development of a long-term strategy; however, there are others
which can be achieved in less time.
In general, most approaches for improved credit results
require an incremental strategy. It should be noted that even
with an incremental approach, to the extent that improvements
can be reached for many of the credit items previously identi-
fied, the market will improve for City obligations, resulting
in lower interest charges being applied to City securities
with City residents paying lower debt service costs.
Some of the credit items previously identified (e.g.,
labor contracts, departmental spending, etc.) can be addressed
through good internal financial management, which is thoroughly
recommended as an important tool for favorable credit response.
However, there are other factors that will require implementation
of a longer term strategy. For example, until the City has
more revenue flexibility, it will not be possible for Boston's
financial condition to be fully viable. Some form of expanded
tax structure which allows the City to have more direct access
to increased economic activities and resources located within
its boundaries would improve the responsiveness of the invest-
ment community to the City of Boston's credit.
As stated previously, the investment community has identi-
fied the high level of fixed costs of the City as a reason for
responding in a more negative way to the securities sold by
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the City. These fixed costs include pension funding, debt
service, the MBTA deficit. Health and Hospital transfers and
similar items. The importance of these fixed costs grows when
the revenue structure limits the level at which revenues increase.
For example, the City for many years has been engaged in providing
large subsidies, most recently, ranging from $15-35 million
per year, for the provision of health care through the City's
Health and Hospitals Corporation. Faced with a fairly static
revenue base of own-source revenues, the City is unable to
increase its own revenues at a rate equal to the recent levels
of inflation for health care. Thus, taking into consideration
that the deficit of Health and Hospital Corporation may increase
significantly over the foreseeable future, to the extent that
the City relies upon its general revenue to finance higher
subsidies to Health and Hospital Corporation, it will have to
achieve cutbacks in other areas of operations. Thus, some
action should be taken in the near term to mitigate the
deleterious effect of Health and Hospitals on the financial
well-being of the City. Several studies have been conducted
on alternative approaches for dealing with this financial
problem: it does appear that only an altered approach to
health care operations could have major beneficial and
financial consequences for the City. This approach toward
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altering operations for subsidized programs will be needed to
balance City resources against liabilities.
In addition, however, it may be possible to combine the
elimination of certain fixed costs, (i.e., pension funding and
the MBTA deficit) by combining those costs with some form of
revenue enhancement. In other words, it may be possible for
one or more of the fixed cost items to be financed through
another revenue source that more directly reflects the economic
realities of the particular circumstances.
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Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, the debt finance and debt management issues
facing Boston in 1984 are substantial, but taken in context,
suggest that the City's 1984 debt and credit policies should
be directed toward meeting the immediate financial needs while
at least protecting, if not enhancing, the City's current credit
position. The City faces a thin cash flow early in 1984 and
has to retire $25 million of bond anticipation notes on June 29,
1984. As a result, the City faces an immediate need to issue
long-term, limited tax bonds in spring, 1984 in order to avoid
a potential serious cash flow shortfall.
The City also has an ongoing need to access the short-
term market to keep itself solvent. First, the City routinely
experiences a thin cash flow balance at various points during
its fiscal year. Second, the majority of property taxes, which
represent the principal source of revenues, is received in
November and May of each year. Hence, the City will have to
issue short-term debt annually in an amount of approximately
$65 million in most years. Thus, the City's ability to convince
investors to purchase short-term debt to finance these short-
falls will depend on the maintenance and enhancement of the
City's basic credit worthiness.
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As history demonstrates, cash flow shortfalls result in
political and financial crises with effects that linger well
beyond the year of the shortfall. In issuing long-term debt
late in fiscal 1984, the City could sell as much as $45-50
million in long-term, general obligation bonds. If the City
sold securities in this amount, approximately half of the bond
proceeds could be applied to the payment of the bond anticipa-
tion notes, with the other half of "new" funds being available
to fund capital projects in fiscal 1985. There are numerous
capital and rehabilitation purposes that could be financed by
these "new" monies, though some of which may be restricted by
court-mandated expenditures.
While the $45-50 million debt issue would meet the
immediate financial needs, special emphasis must be given to
enhancing Boston's credit position in 1984 and beyond. There
are four major factors that have been identified by credit
analysts in the financial community as negatively impacting
the City's credit position. The first is the large degree of
fixed costs: The City's expenses for education, health and
hospitals, debt service, mass transit and pension are financed
directly from the City's operating budget. These expenses put
substantial pressure on Boston's limited revenue sources and
as a result, cause concerns about Boston's ability to access
sufficient revenues to pay all of its obligations.
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The second factor that negatively impacts Boston's credit
standing is the inability of the City to translate its economic
resources into a revenue source. The City's ineffectiveness
is largely due to the restrictions imposed on its ability to
impose and raise taxes. As a result, the City's revenue sources
are largely unresponsive to any economic upsurge occurring in
Boston. One strategy to turn some of the economic activity
into revenues for the City may be to continue to access state
aid which is made available through annual appropriations by
the Commonwealth, since state revenues are more sensitive to
economic activity. However, this source is indirect and is
subject to annual appropriation; expansion of revenues that
are more under the control of the City itself would be met
more favorably by the credit markets.
The third factor limiting Boston's credit position is the
City's inflexible revenue sources, especially its dependency
on property taxes, which are now subject to special budgetary
limitation. Boston's tax structure is highly restricted and,
as a result, will continue to hinder the City's credit worthi-
ness .
The fourth negative factor is the disproportionate assess-
ment refunds that have been and will continue to be paid by
the City. The financial strain imposed by these claims served
to further weaken Boston's financial situation. Monies the
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City committed to pay these refunds were not available fcr
other potential City uses. However/ it appears that the payment
for the majority of these liabilities has been established,
and the credit problem imposed by these liabilities has been
lessened in fiscal 1984. Until all of the Tregor and related
obligations have been retired, the specter of the remaining
payments for these liabilities will remain a credit concern to
the investment community.
Other factors, including among others, the outcome of the
City's labor negotiations, the need to alter the City's debt
repayment schedule, etc., will also impact the perception of
Boston's securities and its ability to attract the necessary
investors for the City's bond and note financings. The City
will have to actively pursue those policies and procedures
that will strengthen the City's credit in the eyes of credit
analysts and potential investors in order to ensure that the
City maintains the sound debt finance and debt management
necessary to keep the City financially and politically viable.
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